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Abstract
	 An	examination	was	conducted	of	the	classification	of	potential	misconduct	in	the	moral	domain	
(rather	 than	 the	 non-moral	 domain).	 Behaviors	 in	 the	 moral,	 social-conventional,	 and	 personal	
domains	differ	with	regard	to	why	and	how	they	are	regulated.	Behaviors	in	the	moral	domain	often	
face	 interference	by	others	due	 to	 reasons	 irrelevant	 to	 existing	 rules	or	norms.	Behaviors	 in	 the	
social-conventional	domain	are	disapproved	of	and	face	interference	only	when	contrary	explicit	or	
implicit	rules	exist.	Behaviors	in	the	personal	domain	reflect	personal	interests	and	tastes,	and	thus,	
they	face	no	interference	by	others.	We	predicted	and	found	that	Americans	consider	a	wider	range	
of	potential	misconducts	as	moral	issues	compared	with	Japanese	people,	who	tend	to	consider	the	
same	 issues	as	 socially	 regulated.	 In	 tight	cultures,	 such	as	 that	observed	 in	 Japan,	behaviors	are	
regulated	by	social	norms	and	authorities,	and	are	evaluated	as	such.	However,	 in	 loose	cultures,	
such	as	 that	observed	in	 the	US,	misconducts	 tend	to	be	attributed	to	 the	actor’s	free	choice,	and	
thus,	the	individual’s	morality	is	at	stake.	These	results	support	the	argument	of	cultural	psychology	
that	moral	judgment	varies	across	cultures.
Keywords:		moral	domain	judgment,	cross-cultural	difference,	social	norm,	moral	judgment,	  
cultural	psychology
	 Moral	judgment	bears	special	importance	among	social	judgments	and	evaluations,	because	it	
involves	 a	 judgment	 of	 right	 and	 wrong,	 and	 thus	 has	 significant	 social	 consequences.	 For	
example,	 if	 homosexuality	 is	 considered	 wrong,	 it	 would	 be	 punished,	 like	 in	 Texas	 before	 its	
“Homosexual	Conduct”	law	was	invalidated	by	the	US	Supreme	Court.	Such	moral	judgments	are	
not	 necessarily	 shared	 among	 all	 individuals	 in	 a	 society.	 Indeed,	 individuals’	 moral	 judgments	
depend	 on	 their	 values,	 beliefs,	 and	 preferences.	 Thus,	 homosexuality	 could	 be	 classified	 as	 a	
moral	issue	or	personal	preference,	depending	on	one’s	beliefs.
	 In	the	present	study,	we	focused	on	the	role	cultures	play	in	everyday	moral	judgment.	Currently,	
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there	are	two	lines	of	research	in	psychology,	one	conducted	by	developmental	psychologists	and	
the	other	by	cultural	 and	 social	psychologists.	Both	place	different	weights	on	 the	 importance	of	
culture	 in	moral	 judgment.	The	 ongoing	 controversy	 between	 these	 two	 camps	 involves	 how	 to	
treat	culture	(Kelly	&	Stich,	2006;	Wainryb,	2006)	as	explained	below.
Social-Cognitive Domain Theory
	 Developmental	psychologists	formulated	traditional	theories	regarding	moral	judgment,	which	
emphasize	 rational	 and	 logical	 thinking	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 moral	 judgment.	 This	 line	 of	 research	
underscores	 harm,	welfare,	 justice,	 and	 rights,	with	 its	 root	 in	 the	work	of	Western	philosophers	
(Haidt,	2008;	Smetana,	2006).	Theories	of	Piaget	(1965)	and	Kohlberg	(1969)	are	representatives	
of	 such	 research	 tradition;	 they	 formulated	 the	 process	 of	 children’s	 development	 from	 lower	 to	
higher	 stages	of	moral	 judgment.	Their	 theories	emphasize	 reasoning	as	 the	main	determinant	of	
moral	 judgment.	 In	 these	 theories,	 culture	 plays	 a	 minor	 role,	 if	 any,	 because	 factors	 affecting	
moral	 judgment,	 such	 as	harm,	 are	 considered	universal	 across	 cultures.	As	 a	 result,	 universality	
of	moral	judgment	has	been	claimed	in	these	theoretical	traditions.
	 Turiel’s	social-cognitive	domain	theory	of	moral	judgment	follows	the	tradition	of	Piaget	and	
Kohlberg.	It	posits	that	morality	and	social	convention	are	distinct	domains,	and	individuals	learn	
to	 acquire	 the	 distinction	 between	 these	 two	 domains	 through	 social	 interactions	 in	 early	
developmental	 stages	 (Turiel,	 1983,	 2003).	 Behaviors	 are	 considered	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 moral	
domain	 when	 their	 consequences	 involve	 harm	 to	 or	 impairment	 of	 others’	 welfare,	 or	 they	
infringe	 upon	 others’	 rights.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 social-conventional	 domain	 is	 composed	 of	
behaviors	violating	rules	regarding	authority,	 tradition,	and	social	norms.	Behaviors	 in	 the	social-
conventional	domain	pertain	to	rules	set	by	the	authority,	and	social	and	cultural	norms.	Behaviors	
such	as	eating	foods	with	one’s	hands,	not	wearing	school	uniforms,	and	addressing	elders	by	first	
names	 are	 considered	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 social-conventional	 domain.	Numerous	 studies	 have	 been	
conducted	 to	 test	 this	 theory	 empirically	 (see	 Smetana,	 2006,	Wainryb,	 2006,	 Turiel,	 2003,	 for	
reviews).	In	a	typical	study	in	this	research	paradigm,	children	are	interviewed	on	what	they	think	
of	various	 transgressions	 they	have	experienced	 in	everyday	 life,	or	 those	described	 in	vignettes.	
Preschool	 children	 are	 found	 to	 largely	 classify	 events	 they	 encounter	 in	 their	 everyday	 life	 into	
moral	or	social-conventional	domains,	using	the	above	criteria	(Nucci	&	Turiel,	1978).
	 Behaviors	can	also	be	classified	into	the	personal	domain,	which	is	not	concerned	with	morality	
or	 social	 conventions.	The	personal	 domain	 consists	 of	 behaviors	 that	 are	 the	matter	 of	 personal	
preference	or	taste.	Nucci	(1981)	proposed	that	the	domain	of	personal	issues	exists	in	addition	to	
the	 moral	 and	 social-conventional	 domains	 of	 judgments.	 Behaviors	 in	 the	 moral,	 social-
conventional,	and	personal	domains	differ	in	terms	of	why	and	how	they	are	regulated.	Behaviors	
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in	 the	moral	domain	are	usually	 interfered	with	by	others	owing	 to	 reasons	 irrelevant	 to	existing	
rules	 or	 norms.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 behaviors	 in	 the	 social-conventional	 domain	 are	 disapproved	
and	 interfered	 with	 only	 when	 there	 are	 corresponding	 explicit	 or	 implicit	 rules	 against	 them.	
Behaviors	 in	 the	 personal	 domain	 reflect	 one’s	 interests	 and	 tastes,	 and	 thus,	 they	 are	 not	
interfered	with	by	others.
Cross-cultural differences in domain judgment
	 While	Turiel’s	 social-cognitive	domain	 theory	has	 its	 root	 in	Western	philosophical	 thinking	
and	 its	 initial	 development	 was	 based	 on	 studies	 conducted	 on	 children	 in	 the	 US	 (Nucci	 &	
Turiel,	1978),	 the	 theory	has	been	 tested	with	children	 in	more	 than	a	dozen	countries	 in	various	
regions,	 including	East	Asia,	Middle	East,	and	Africa	(see	Wainryb,	2006	for	a	review).	Previous	
studies	 have	 supported	 the	 basic	 principle	 of	 the	 theory,	 that	 children	 in	 various	 cultures	
distinguish	 behaviors	 causing	 direct	 harm	 onto	 others	 from	 those	 prohibited	 or	 sanctioned	 by	
authorities	 or	 norms.	 These	 studies	 made	 a	 distinction	 regarding	 its	 generalizability	 and	
universality.
	 For	example,	Yau	and	Smetana	(1996)	interviewed	young	children	aged	4	and	6	years,	using	
7	 vignettes	 to	 examine	 their	 domain	 judgments.	 Three	 types	 of	 vignettes	 were	 prepared,	 to	 be	
classified	 into	 the	moral,	 social-conventional,	or	personal	domains.	Hitting	and	 teasing	 fell	under	
the	moral	domain,	whereas	calling	a	teacher	by	her	first	and	last	name	or	eating	with	one’s	fingers	
fell	 under	 the	 conventional	 domain.	 Choice	 of	 a	 snack,	 a	 playmate,	 and	 an	 activity	 during	 free	
time	were	 included	under	 the	personal	domains.	After	 reading	 the	vignettes,	children	were	asked	
about	 the	 protagonists’	 behaviors.	 Yau	 and	 Smetana	 (1996)	 found	 that	 children	 considered	
transgressions	 in	 the	 moral	 vignettes	 wrong	 regardless	 of	 their	 geographical	 location	 or	 the	
presence	 of	 authorities.	While	 hitting	was	 judged	wrong	wherever	 it	was	 conducted,	 eating	with	
fingers	 was	 judged	 inappropriate	 only	 when	 there	 existed	 rules	 or	 authorities	 against	 such	
behavior.
	 Though	Turiel’s	theory	asserts	that	“whether	it	causes	harm	onto	others”	is	the	only	criterion	
that	 individuals	 use	 in	 the	 moral	 domain,	 the	 existence	 of	 cross-cultural	 differences	 is	 widely	
acknowledged	 by	 researchers	 (e.g.,	 Killen	 &	 Smetana,	 1999;	 Turiel,	 2003;	 Nucci,	 Camino,	 &	
Sapiro,	 1996).	 In	 general,	 developmental	 psychologists	 have	 found	 some	 diversity	 in	 domain	
judgments	 and	 reasoning	 across	 cultures.	 Yet,	 they	 have	 emphasized	 the	 cross-cultural	
commonalities	in	their	findings	and	have	claimed	the	universality	of	domain	judgments.
	 Exceptionally,	some	studies	have	provided	initial	evidence	about	the	effect	of	culture	on	domain	
judgments.	Miller,	 Bersoff,	 and	Harwood	 (1990)	 examined	moral	 domain	 judgments	 on	 helping	
behaviors.	 In	 their	 study,	 the	 degree	 of	 need	 was	 manipulated	 in	 vignettes	 describing	 someone	
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refusing	 to	 help	 others.	Their	 Indian	 participants	 tended	 to	 view	 the	 failure	 of	 helping	 others	 in	
moral	 terms,	 whereas	 their	 American	 counterparts	 regarded	 it	 in	 moral	 terms	 only	 in	 a	 life-
threatening	 situation.	Nucci,	 Camino,	 and	 Sapiro	 (1996)	 found	 that	 the	 social	 class	 of	 Brazilian	
children	influenced	their	domain	judgments.	Specifically,	lower-class	children	were	more	likely	to	
consider	conventions	as	authority-independent	and	generalizable	 than	were	middle-class	children.	
This	 cross-cultural	 difference	 corresponds	 to	 the	 individual-collectivistic	 dimension	 of	 cultural	
diversity	 (Hofstede,	 1980;	 Oyserman,	 Coon,	 &	 Kemmelmeiser,	 2002),	 because	 lower-class	
children	were	considered	more	collectivistic	than	were	middle-class	children	(Nucci	et	al.,	1996).
Criticism against the social-cognitive domain theory from a cultural perspective
	 Cultural	psychologists	have	been	critical	of	Turiel	and	his	 followers’	claim	 that	 the	criterion	
for	 moral	 domain	 judgment	 (i.e.,	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 an	 actor)	 is	 universal.	 Haidt,	 Koller,	 and	
Dias	 (1993),	 for	 example,	 showed	 that	 people	 with	 low	 socio-economic	 status	 in	 the	 US	 and	
Brazil	 judged	 harmless	 but	 offensive	 behaviors	 (such	 as	 using	 the	 national	 flag	 for	 cleaning	
bathroom,	incestuous	kissing,	and	masturbating	with	a	dead	chicken)	as	morally	wrong.	This	result	
indicates	that	potential	misconduct	without	harm	can	be	classified	into	the	moral	domain.
Present approach
	 The	 present	 study	 aimed	 to	 integrate	 these	 two	 lines	 of	 research	 traditions.	 Developmental	
psychologists	 have	 insisted	 on	 the	 universality	 of	 moral	 judgment.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 cultural	
psychologists	 have	 focused	 on	 culturally	 variant	 moral	 judgments.	 Indeed,	 in	 our	 view,	
developmental	 psychologists	 used	descriptions	of	potential	misconduct	universally	 classified	 into	
one	 domain,	 such	 as	 hitting	 someone	 (in	 case	 of	 the	 moral	 domain)	 or	 eating	 food	 with	 one’s	
hands	 (in	 case	 of	 the	 social-conventional	 domain).	 In	 those	 examples,	 across	 cultures,	 research	
participants	 were	 found	 to	 be	 able	 to	 distinguish	 these	 dimensions	 from	 early	 developmental	
stages,	 presumably	 guided	 by	 the	 fundamental	 principle	 that	 harm	 is	 the	 only	 criterion	 for	 the	
moral	 domain	 (e.g.,	 Turiel,	 2003).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 cultural	 psychologists	 have	 focused	 on	
potential	misconduct	without	harm,	which	 intended	to	 identify	 the	variability	 in	moral	 judgments	
across	 cultures.	 Indeed,	 in	 Haidt	 et	 al.’s	 (1993)	 study,	 culture	 and	 SES	 were	 shown	 to	 affect	
individuals’	 moral	 judgments.	 In	 sum,	 previous	 studies	 have	 not	 provided	 convergent	 evidence	
regarding	the	universality	or	variability	of	moral	judgments	across	cultures.
	 The	 present	 study	 therefore	 employed	 both	 perspectives,	 that	 of	 typical	misconduct	 used	 in	
Turiel	and	his	colleagues’	studies,	and	those	used	by	cultural	psychologists.	That	is,	both	potential	
misconduct	 with	 harm	 and	 those	 without	 harm	 were	 used.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 according	 to	
Turiel’s	 (1983,	 2003)	 theory,	 descriptions	 of	 misconduct	 are	 categorized	 into	 the	 moral	 domain	
only	when	 they	 hurt	 someone,	 like	 in	 stealing	 and	 cheating.	Misconduct	without	 harm	 is	 either	
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categorized	into	the	social-conventional	or	personal	domain.	However,	cultural	psychologists,	such	
as	 Sweder,	 Much,	 Mahapatra,	 and	 Park	 (1997),	 insist	 that	 behaviors	 without	 harm	 can	 be	
considered	moral	 issues	 in	 some	 cultures,	 suggesting	 that	 culture	 affects	 the	moral	 judgment	 of	
misconduct	 without	 harm.	 The	 challenge	 against	 Turiel’s	 theory	 from	 a	 cultural	 perspective,	
however,	 has	 been	 limited,	 because	 respondents’	 domain	 judgments	 have	 never	 been	 measured	
explicitly	 (i.e.,	 Haidt	 et	 al.,	 1993).	Thus,	 forced-choice	 style	 questions	were	 used	 in	 the	 present	
study,	 to	 assess	 the	 moral	 domain	 judgments	 directly.	 Respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 classify	
descriptions	 of	 potential	misconduct	 into	 one	 of	 the	 three	 domains,	 when	 they	 considered	 them	
unacceptable.
	 To	 examine	 cultural	 effects	 on	 moral	 judgments,	 Japanese	 and	American	 participants	 were	
included	 in	 the	 present	 sample.	 Comparison	 of	 domain	 judgments	 in	 these	 two	 cultures	 is	
expected	 to	 reveal	 the	 aspects	of	domain	 judgments	 that	vary	with	 cultures	 as	well	 as	 those	 that	
remain	invariant	across	cultures.
Predictions
	 Based	on	previous	studies,	we	expected	that	cultural	differences	would	emerge	in	moral	domain	
judgments	 of	 potential	 misconduct.	 More	 specifically,	 Japanese	 participants	 were	 expected	 to	
classify	 a	 narrower	 range	 of	 potential	 misconduct	 into	 the	 moral	 domain	 as	 compared	 to	
Americans.	 The	 Japanese	 culture	 is	 characterized	with	 tightness	 (Triandis,	 1989).	 Tight	 cultures	
tend	to	promote	norms,	and	deviation	from	those	norms	is	often	punished	by	the	authority.	Thus,	
people	 in	 tight	 cultures	 would	 evaluate	 potential	 misconduct	 in	 terms	 of	 norm	 and	 authority,	
which	leads	Japanese	individuals	to	classify	fewer	potential	misconducts	into	the	moral	domain	as	
compared	with	Americans,	who	 belong	 to	 a	 loose	 culture	 (in	which	 freedom	 and	 deviations	 are	
encouraged).	 Masuda	 and	 Nisbett	 (2001)	 reported	 that	 East	 Asians	 consider	 more	 contextual	
information	in	cognitive	tasks.	Because	information	on	norms	and	authority	lies	 in	the	context	of	
the	 behavior,	 Japanese	 participants’	 attention	 on	 the	 context	would	 further	 lead	 them	 to	 classify	
misconduct	 into	 the	 social-conventional	 domain.	 The	 other	 side	 of	 the	 coin	 is	 that	 Japanese	
participants	 would	 tend	 to	 classify	 more	 potential	 misconducts	 into	 the	 social-conventional	
domain	as	compared	to	their	American	counterparts.
Methods
Participants
	 Participants	were	356	American	(229	women,	111	men,	16	unknown)	and	323	Japanese	(159	
women	and	164	men)	undergraduate	students	who	received	course	credit	for	their	participation	in	
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this	study.	The	mean	age	of	the	participants	was	19.3	(SD	=	1.75)	years	in	the	US	and	19.8	(SD = 
1.21)	years	in	Japan.
Moral orientation assessment items.
	 To	 assess	 the	 moral	 domain	 judgments	 of	 potential	 misconducts	 with	 or	 without	 harm,	 28	
descriptions	 of	 behaviors	 that	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 misconducts	 were	 collected	 (Table	 1),	
including	 behaviors	 sampled	 from	 the	 Morally	 Debatable	 Behaviors	 Scale	 (Katz,	 Santman,	 &	
Lonero,	 1993),	 those	 used	 by	 Haidt	 et	 al.	 (1993),	 and	 those	 originally	 constructed	 by	 the	 first	
author	 of	 the	 present	 paper.	 The	 potential	 misconduct	 ranged	 from	 typically	 used	 ones	 in	 the	
Social-Cognitive	 Domain	 Theory,	 which	 are	 relatively	 simple	 misconducts	 with	 harm	 (such	 as	
stealing)	 and	 without	 harm	 (such	 as	 eating	 with	 hands),	 to	 potential	 misconducts	 that	 can	 be	
categorized	 into	 more	 than	 one	 domain	 (such	 as	 abortion).	 The	 original	 English	 version	 was	
translated	into	Japanese	via	back	translation	(Brislin,	1980).
	 Respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 classify	 the	 described	 behaviors	 into	 one	 of	 the	 following	 four	
categories,	 with	 the	 instruction	 “Please	 indicate	 what	 you	 think	 about	 each	 of	 the	 following	
behaviors.”	Responses	were	made	in	a	forced-choice	style,	and	one	of	four	categories	was	chosen	
for	each	behavior	description:
	 A.	Acceptable	behavior
	 B.	Personally	unrewarding,	unhealthy,	or	distasteful
	 C.	Socially	inappropriate	or	undesirable
	 D.	Morally	or	ethically	wrong
	 For	 those	who	 considered	 the	 behavior	 unacceptable,	 three	 reasons	were	 provided	 to	 assess	
their	 moral	 domain	 judgments.	 Classification	 of	 the	 behavior	 into	 the	 category	 of	 morally	 or	
ethically	 wrong	 behavior	 (Category	 D)	 means	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 moral	 domain,	 whereas	 the	
“personally	 unrewarding,	 unhealthy,	 or	 distasteful”	 (Category	 B)	 and	 “socially	 inappropriate	 or	
undesirable”	 (Category	 C)	 categories	 referred	 to	 the	 personal	 and	 social-conventional	 domain,	
respectively.	 The	 category	 of	 acceptable	 behavior	 (Category	 A)	 was	 provided	 for	 those	 who	
classified	the	behavior	as	acceptable	and	not	as	a	misconduct.
	 The	 moral	 orientation	 assessment	 items	 yielded	 three	 scores:	 moral	 orientation	 (M),	 social	
orientation	(S),	and	personal	orientation	(P)	scores.	The	moral	orientation	score	was	computed	as	
the	 number	 of	 behaviors	 classified	 as	 “morally	 or	 ethically	wrong,”	 reflecting	 one’s	 tendency	 to	
judge	issues	according	to	their	moral	implications.	The	number	of	behaviors	classified	as	“socially	
inappropriate	or	undesirable”	yielded	the	social	orientation	score,	reflecting	one’s	tendency	to	use	
social	norm	and	convention	as	 the	basis	for	moral	 judgments.	The	personal	orientation	score	was	
the	 number	 of	 behaviors	 considered	 as	 “personally	 unrewarding,	 unhealthy,	 or	 distasteful.”	 The	
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Table	1	 Proportions	of	moral	judgments	by	country
Behavior
US Japan
A P S M A P S M
1 Taking	money	from	a	collection	plate＊ .02 .04 .06 .89 .03 .05 .23 .68
2 Eating	a	family	dog	that	was	run	over	by	a	car .02 .28 .15 .55 .02 .31 .10 .57
3
Taking	 and	 driving	 away	 a	 car	 belonging	 to	
someone	else	(joyriding)＊
.03 .12 .33 .52 .02 .05 .47 .46
4 Not	taking	a	bath	for	a	week .04 .57 .30 .09 .07 .63 .19 .11
5 Cheating	on	an	examination＊ .04 .30 .16 .49 .11 .13 .47 .29
6
Eating	 sea	 turtle	 eggs	 even	 though	 they	 are	 an	
endangered	species
.05 .21 .25 .50 .06 .19 .34 .41
7
Failing	to	report	damage	they	accidentally	did	to	
a	parked	vehicle
.08 .16 .37 .39 .05 .13 .49 .32
8 Committing	suicide＊ .08 .18 .08 .66 .14 .22 .26 .38
9 A	man	having	sex	with	a	prostitute＊ .09 .28 .29 .34 .24 .40 .24 .12
10 Aiding	someone	to	commit	suicide＊ .09 .10 .12 .69 .05 .23 .20 .52
11
A	physician	rejecting	patients	with	HIV/AIDS	out	
of	fear	of	getting	infected＊
.10 .09 .24 .57 .03 .07 .37 .53
12
Taking	a	second	helping	even	though	there	is	not	
enough	for	everyone＊
.11 .25 .49 .15 .03 .23 .44 .31
13 Lying	for	their	own	interest＊ .11 .40 .18 .31 .30 .35 .24 .12
14 Cheating	on	their	taxes	if	they	have	the	chance＊ .14 .18 .31 .37 .10 .10 .53 .27
15 Buying	something	they	knew	was	stolen＊ .14 .24 .21 .41 .10 .28 .41 .21
16 Shredding	and	discarding	an	unnecessary	flag＊ .14 .08 .32 .45 .25 .20 .29 .26
17 Keeping	some	money	they	found＊ .16 .18 .21 .44 .20 .15 .41 .25
18 Avoiding	a	fare	on	public	transport .18 .22 .36 .23 .14 .19 .47 .21
19 Eating	food	that	had	fallen	on	the	floor .19 .69 .09 .03 .30 .59 .09 .03
20 Using	marijuana	or	hashish＊ .30 .43 .15 .12 .06 .21 .31 .43
21 A	man	dressing	like	a	woman＊ .31 .17 .32 .20 .57 .32 .07 .04
22 Engaging	in	homosexual	activity＊ .33 .22 .18 .28 .22 .44 .16 .18
23 A	girl	having	sex	under	the	legal	age	of	consent＊ .36 .24 .20 .20 .24 .27 .34 .15
24 A	woman	getting	an	abortion＊ .40 .18 .09 .33 .25 .32 .27 .16
25 Smoking	in	public＊ .41 .32 .24 .03 .13 .30 .43 .14
26 Getting	a	divorce＊ .55 .19 .15 .12 .13 .47 .29 .12
27 Selling	their	sperm	or	eggs＊ .57 .17 .12 .15 .22 .26 .22 .31
28 Getting	married	despite	their	parents	objections＊ .62 .21 .11 .06 .51 .27 .18 .03
＊ p	<	. 001.
Note.	A,	 P,	 S,	 and	M	 correspond	 to	Acceptable,	 Personal,	 Social-Conventional,	 and	Moral,	 respectively.	 Proportions	 of	
judgments	for	behavior	descriptions	with	an	asterisk	differed	between	the	US	and	Japan.
category	of	acceptable	behavior	was	not	used	for	calculating	these	scores.
Moral domain judgment 53
Procedure
	 Participants	 were	 asked	 to	 complete	 a	 questionnaire,	 which	 included	 the	 moral	 orientation	
assessment	items,	in	their	classroom.
Results
Overview of the analysis
	 First,	 we	 examined	 cultural	 differences	 in	 domain	 judgments	 by	 comparing	 proportions	 of	
behaviors	 classified	 into	 each	 domain.	 Then,	 cultural	 differences	 in	 the	 three	 scores	 of	 moral	
orientation	 were	 examined	 to	 test	 our	 predictions.	 Finally,	 a	 Multiple	 Correspondence	Analysis	
(MCA)	was	conducted	to	visualize	the	relationships	among	the	domain	judgments	of	misconduct.
Cultural differences in domain judgment
	 The	proportions	of	judgments	for	each	behavior	description	in	the	moral	orientation	assessment	
by	 culture	 have	 been	 presented	 in	 Table	 1.	 Evidently,	 there	 were	 cultural	 differences	 in	 moral	
judgments.	 Specifically,	 significant	 cultural	 differences	were	 found	 in	 22	 out	 of	 the	 28	 behavior	
descriptions	(p	<	.001,	group-wise	alpha	<	.05).	Additionally,	classifications	of	the	behaviors	were	
not	 unanimous	 among	 the	 two	 cultures.	 Less	 than	 40%	 of	 the	 behaviors	 (39%	 and	 25%	 for	 the	
American	 and	 Japanese	 samples,	 respectively)	 had	 a	 dominant	 category	 with	 agreement	 of	 the	
majority.
	 The	 following	 three	 scores	were	calculated	by	counting	 the	number	of	classification	 to	each	
of	 the	 three	categories:	moral	orientation	 (M),	 social	orientation	 (S),	and	personal	orientation	 (P) 
scores.	The	Kuder-Richardson	 20	 coefficient	 of	 reliability	 for	M,	 S,	 and	 P	 scores	were	 .76,	 .68,	
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Figure	1	 Mean	scores	on	subscales	of	the	Moral	Orientation	Scale	by	culture
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and	.59,	respectively.	A	satisfactory	level	of	reliability	was	obtained	for	the	M	score,	although	the	
reliability	coefficients	for	the	S	and	P	scores	were	lower.
	 Figure	 1	 shows	 the	 mean	 moral	 orientation	 scores	 by	 culture.	 As	 predicted,	 American	
participants	 (M	 =	 9.66,	SD	 =	 4.30)	 classified	 a	wider	 range	 of	 behaviors	 into	 the	moral	 domain	
than	did	Japanese	participants	(M	=	7.46,	SD	=	4.56) (F(1,	682)	=	42.19,	p	<	 .001).	Addition,	as	
predicted,	Japanese	participants	(M	=	8.50,	SD	=	4.44)	scored	higher	on	social	orientation	than	did	
American	participants	(M	=	6.15,	SD	=	3.21) (F(1,	682)	=	63.47,	p	<	.001).	In	the	personal	domain,	
scores	of	American	 (M	=	6.99,	SD	=	3.29)	 and	 Japanese	participants	 (M	=	7.49,	SD	=	3.90) did 
not	differ	significantly	(F(1,	682)	=	3.365,	p	<	.07).
Structures of moral domain judgments
	 In	 order	 to	 visualize	 the	 cross-cultural	 differences	 and	 commonalities	 in	 moral	 domain	
judgments,	 categorical	 responses	 were	 mapped	 into	 a	 two-dimensional	 space	 using	 the	
quantization	plot	of	MCA.	In	the	quantization	plot,	symbols	represent	participants’	classifications.	
The	 distance	 between	 two	 symbols	 is	 interpreted	 as	 the	 likelihood	 of	 concurrence	 of	 the	 two	
classifications.	Thus,	 two	 symbols	 close	 to	 each	 other	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 chosen	 at	 the	 same	
time	by	a	respondent	than	are	those	located	far	from	each	other.
	 To	 provide	 a	 clear	 picture	 of	 the	 relationships	 among	 the	 participants’	 classifications,	
theoretically	 different	 sets	 of	 items	were	 analyzed	 separately	 using	MCA.	The	 first	 set	 of	 items	
contained	the	behaviors	causing	direct	harm,	for	example,	lying	(No.13).	The	behaviors	presented	
in	 the	 quantization	 plots	 (Figures	 2)	 are	 those	 that	 are	 typically	 categorized	 as	 issues	 of	 moral	
regulation	 in	 previous	 studies	 on	 moral	 domain	 judgment.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 lying	 (No.13),	 circles	
with	the	letter	M,	S,	P,	and	A	represent	American	and	Japanese	participants’	classification	for	this	
particular	 item.	 In	 Figure	 2a	 and	 2b,	 the	 circle	with	 the	 letter	M	 is	 closer	 to	 the	 other	 symbols	
with	the	letter	M,	than	to	those	with	other	letters.	This	indicates	that	those	who	categorized	lying	
into	 the	moral	 domain	were	more	 likely	 to	 categorize	 other	misconducts	 into	 the	 same	 domain.	
Similarly,	symbols	with	the	letter	A	are	closer	to	each	other.	On	the	other	hand,	symbols	with	the	
letters	S	or	P	are	relatively	closer	to	each	other	than	to	those	with	the	letters	A	or	M.	This	means	
those	who	categorized	one	of	 the	behaviors	 into	 the	social-convention	domain	are	more	 likely	 to	
categorize	the	other	behaviors	either	in	the	social-conventional	domain	or	in	the	personal	domain,	
than	to	consider	them	acceptable	or	to	categorize	them	in	the	moral	domain.
	 Figure	2a	and	2a	for	the	American	and	Japanese	samples	show	a	consistent	two-dimensional	
structure	 of	 domain	 judgments.	 The	 horizontal	 axis	 (Dimension	 1)	 represents	 the	 degree	 of	
acceptability.	 Symbols	 with	 the	 letter	A	 have	 lower	 values	 on	 this	 axis,	 whereas	 those	with	 the	
letter	M	have	higher	values.	Classifications	 into	 the	social-conventional	and	personal	domains	 lie	
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in	 the	middle.	The	vertical	 axis	 (Dimension	2)	 represents	 the	 degree	 to	which	one	 perceives	 the	
behavior	as	a	matter	of	morality	or	not.	At	the	lower	end	of	this	axis	lie	the	acceptable	and	moral	
domains,	 and	 the	 social-conventional	 and	 personal	 domains	 lie	 at	 the	 higher	 end	 of	 this	 axis.	
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Figure	2	 Quantization	plots	of	stealing,	cheating,	and	lying	behaviors	for	US	(a)	and	Japanese	(b)	samples.
Figure	3	 	Quantization	plots	of	behaviors	typically	categorized	into	the	social-conventional	domain	for	US	
(a)	and	Japanese	(b)	samples.
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Scoring	 low	 on	 this	 dimension	 corresponded	 to	 classification	 of	 behaviors	 in	 the	 acceptable	 or	
moral	 domains,	 meaning	 that	 the	 judgments	 were	 governed	 by	 morality	 (behaviors	 are	 either	
morally	wrong	or	acceptable).	On	the	other	hand,	those	who	scored	high	on	this	dimension	tended	
to	 classify	 behaviors	 more	 often	 into	 the	 social	 and	 personal	 domains.	 In	 these	 classifications,	
judgments	leave	room	for	contextual	consideration.
	 The	 second	 set	 of	 behaviors	 contained	 descriptions	 typically	 classified	 into	 the	 social-
conventional	domain	in	previous	studies,	such	as	cross-dressing	(No.21).	Behaviors	in	this	set	are	
not	 supposed	 to	 cause	 any	 direct	 harm	 to	 others	 and	 they	may	 be	 acceptable.	 Figure	 3a	 and	 3b	
show	 the	 quantization	 plot	 for	American	 and	 Japanese	 samples,	 respectively.	These	 quantization	
plots	showed	the	same	relationships	as	those	observed	in	Figure	2a	and	2b.
Discussion
	 Responses	 to	 the	moral	orientation	assessment	 items	by	American	and	 Japanese	participants	
revealed	 substantial	 cultural	 differences	 in	 moral	 domain	 judgments.	 As	 expected,	 cultural	
differences	 were	 also	 observed	 in	 moral	 and	 social	 orientation	 scores,	 such	 that	 American	
participants	 classified	more	 behaviors	 into	 the	moral	 domain	 and	 less	 behaviors	 into	 the	 social-
conventional	domain	than	did	Japanese	participants.
	 Regarding	the	controversy	over	the	universality	of	harm	as	the	only	criterion	of	moral	domain	
judgment,	 a	 quick	 glimpse	 at	 Table	 1	 would	 be	 sufficient	 to	 convince	 us	 that	 most	 participants	
used	the	moral	domain	to	judge	behaviors	that	do	not	bring	any	harm	to	others.	The	present	study	
is	 not	 the	 first	 to	 report	 such	 findings	 (e.g.,	 Nichols,	 2002,	 2004;	 Haidt,	 1993).	As	 a	 rebuttal,	
Turiel	 (2003)	 argued	 that	 categorizing	 behaviors	 not	 causing	 direct	 physical	 harm	 to	 others	 into	
the	moral	 domain	may	 be	 a	 reflection	 of	 broader	 conceptualization	 of	 harm.	For	 example,	 those	
who	think	not	 taking	a	bath	for	a	week	 is	a	moral	 issue	may	possibly	consider	 the	psychological	
harm	 inflicted	 by	 the	 odor	 produced	 by	 the	 behavior.	Another	 example	 is	 cross-dressing,	 which	
might	 make	 those	 who	 observe	 the	 behavior	 uncomfortable,	 thus	 causing	 psychological	 harm.	
Because	 there	 is	 no	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 support	 this	 claim,	 its	 veracity	 is	 not	 certain.	
Additionally,	this	logic,	in	its	extremity,	makes	morality	a	matter	of	preference,	which	contradicts	
the	Western	philosophical	perspective	 that	 forms	 the	basis	of	 the	 social	 cognitive	domain	 theory.	
Not	 only	 did	 some	American	 and	 Japanese	 participants	 chose	 the	 moral	 domain	 for	 behaviors	
traditionally	considered	as	conventional	in	nature,	some	of	them	also	classified	behaviors	causing	
direct	harm	to	others	into	the	personal	or	social-conventional	domains.
	 The	present	 study	 revealed	not	only	 the	significant	cultural	differences	 in	domain	 judgments	
but	also	 the	common	structure	of	moral	domains.	Relations	among	domains	were	similar	 in	both	
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cultures.	 It	 appears	 that	 the	 structure	of	 domains	 is	 shared	by	both	 cultures,	which	have	 the	 two	
dimensions	of	acceptability	and	morality.	However	the	American	and	Japanese	samples	differed	in	
terms	 of	 the	 typical	 domains	 they	 used	 to	 judge	 misconduct,	 including	 those	 which	 have	 been	
considered	typically	moral	or	conventional	by	developmental	psychologists.
	 This	 study	 confirmed	 the	 cross-cultural	 differences	 in	moral	 orientation	 between	Americans	
and	 Japanese.	There	 are,	however,	 several	 limitations	 regarding	 the	moral	orientation	assessment	
items	 used.	 First,	 perhaps	 because	 we	 included	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 potential	 misconducts,	 the	
internal	 consistency	 of	 the	 social	 and	 personal	 orientation	 score	 were	 was	 than	 satisfactory.	
Secondly,	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	 the	 list	 of	 behaviors	 was	 exhaustive.	With	 the	 inclusion	 of	
more	 varied	 behaviors,	 different	 cultural	 differences	may	 be	 revealed.	Thirdly,	 the	 population	 of	
this	 study	comprised	young	American	and	Japanese	students	who	 lived	 in	a	highly	 industrialized	
and	 modernized	 society,	 as	 observed	 in	 most	 cross-cultural	 studies.	 Participants	 from	 countries	
with	different	cultural	backgrounds	and	of	different	age	groups	would	be	desirable	to	examine	the	
generalizability	of	the	present	findings.	Further	research	is	needed	to	address	these	issues.
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